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The Electoral Cycle in Political Contributions: 
The Incumbency Advantage of Early Elections 
 
Abstract 
The occurrence of early elections varies significantly between and within electoral democracies. 
Previous studies have investigated the determinants and the electoral consequences of early elections. 
However, whether early elections affect financial contributions to political parties has not been 
independently studied. This article argues that incumbent government parties gain a relative advantage 
compared to non-government parties with regards to private contributions in years of early elections. 
This argument is tested using party-level data from Denmark. Taking party-fixed effects into account, 
the results show a strong incumbency advantage in private contributions for early elections. The 
findings suggest that the ability to call early elections gives incumbent parties an additional advantage 
besides being able to call elections when economic conditions and opinion polls are favorable.  
 
 
Keywords: Elections; election timing; incumbency advantage; political parties; party finance. 
 
  
2 
 
Introduction 
Do early elections – elections held before the end of the electoral term - provide an advantage to 
incumbent government parties with regards to party funding? The extent to which incumbent 
governments are able to call elections early, and whether governments actually exercise this power, 
vary significantly between democratic countries and within these countries over time. While early 
elections have been common in the Dutch and Danish political systems and were a key feature of the 
British political system 1  before the enactment of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act in 2011, all 
Norwegian election since WWII were held in the year, they was officially scheduled. In the 
intermediate case of Sweden only two parliamentary elections in the post-war period were held in non-
scheduled years. But what are the political consequences of these early elections and does the ability to 
call these elections alter the balance of power between government and opposition parties?  
 
In recent decades, the political science literature on elections has paid closer attention to the issue of 
whether elections are held as scheduled or called early by incumbent governments. Most of the political 
science and political economy literature on early election calling has relied on the framework of 
political business cycles where, starting with Nordhaus (1975), the argument is that an incumbent 
government will try to manipulate the economy before elections in order to maximize voter support, 
which gives rise to electoral cycles in public policies, see Alesina et al. (1997) for a seminal study of 
these phenomena. Using the same logic, early studies from Japan (Ito, 1990) suggested that an 
                                                          
1  Which however still allowed for early elections as in June 2017. See Smith (2003) for a seminal study of this phenomenon 
in the context of the UK. See Smith 2003 for a seminal study of the phenomenon in the UK.  
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incumbent which are able to call early elections, and thus to determine the time of the election, would 
choose times of favorable economic conditions to call elections. Other early empirical studies of Japan 
(Cargill and Hutchison 1991) and India (Chuwdhury 1991) also suggest such a relationship. Choosing 
times of favorable economic fundamentals 2  and general government popularity could thus be a 
supplement or a substitute for pre-electoral economic or fiscal manipulation. Kayser (2005) develops a 
theoretical model predicting under which circumstances governments will manipulate the economy 
before upcoming elections and when they will call early elections. Regarding comparative evidence for 
the occurrence of this type of electoral surfing Kayser (2006) finds that export expansions are a 
predictor of early election in 13 OECD-countries, while Riera (2015) in a study of 21 OECD countries 
finds that the occurrence of early elections is positively associated with higher GDP growth and occurs 
more frequently under minority governments and single-party governments. There is indeed some 
evidence that governments do call early elections for opportunistic reasons.  
 
Intuitively, the ability of incumbent government to choose the date of the election and thus surf 
according to favorable economic circumstances and general popularity should yield benefits for 
incumbent government parties, and the results from the research on the occurrence of early elections at 
least suggest that incumbent might act according to this belief. A few empirical studies have tried to 
assess the actual electoral benefit of early elections. Smith (2003) in a study of British elections argues 
that because early elections serve as a signal for future expected economic declines, incumbent 
governments might on some occasions be electorally punished for early elections depending on the 
                                                          
2 Normally thought to be the big two/three: inflation/growth and unemployment of the economic voting literature (Lewis-
Beck and Paldam  2000, 114). 
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level of predictability of the early election. In contrast, Schleiter and Tavits (2016) in a comparative 
study of 27 European countries find a significant incumbent vote gain for early elections.  
 
So, under some circumstances, incumbent government parties have an electoral advantage in their 
ability to call elections, presumable because they can choose times of general government popularity 
and robust economic fundamentals to call elections. But does the incumbency advantage in the ability 
to call early elections extend beyond this? Does the ability to decide and know the exact timing of the 
elections also give incumbent parties an advantage in resource mobilization, including financial 
support? The previous scholarly literature on both early elections, incumbency advantage and the 
causes and effects of political party finance does not seem to have addressed this issue.  
 
While there has been an extensive research in US politics and increasingly in comparative politics 
about the differences in the electoral yield of campaign spending between incumbent and challenging 
candidates and parties (Scarrow 2007a, 197-201; Benoit and Marsh 2008; Johnson 2012), the 
relationship between incumbency and the magnitude of political contributions have received much less 
attention outside the US. Most comparative studies of political parties’ finances have been concerned 
with the spending side of party finance or the impact of general party finance regulation (Scarrow 
2007a; Scarrow 2007b; Köppl-Turyna 2014; Potter and Tavits 2015)3 rather than the determinants of 
differences in parties’ private contributions, which in many countries is the foundation for actual 
                                                          
3 See also Cahill and Tomashevskiy (2019) for a recent paper on the effect of political contributions on political parties’ 
policy positions.  
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campaign spending. An exception is Tomashevskiy (2015) who suggests that right-wing parties might 
benefit relatively with regards to private contributions from increased inflows of portfolio investment 
yields and that – unsurprisingly  –  political parties receive more private funding in election years 
(Tomashevskiy 2015, 784). But this article represents a rare piece on the determinants of private 
contributions in comparative politics and does not develop a theoretical argument about the relationship 
between the electoral calendar and private political contributions further. Furthermore, it does not 
address the role of incumbent’s ability to call early elections. To the knowledge of the author, no 
research has been done on how early elections affects party funding. The timing of political 
contributions and to what extent there is an incumbency advantage in the magnitude of private political 
contributions have mainly been studied in the two-party US context (McCarty and Rothenberg 2000; 
Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2005; Fouirnaises and Hall 2014) where elections dates are generally fixed.  
 
This article specifically theorizes and tests whether government parties has a relative advance in the 
magnitude of private funding in years of non-scheduled elections in the context of a multiparty system. 
It thus represents the first study to investigate the effects of early elections on party finance. It builds on 
an argument that incumbent government parties can use information asymmetry about when elections 
are to be held to activate party fundraisers and to signal a higher demand for financial contributions to 
their potential donors in order to gain a relative advantage in private funding. This argument is tested 
on a novel dataset of Danish political parties’ private funding in the years 1991-2013, where detailed 
party finance data exists. The results show a strong incumbency advantage in party funding for non-
scheduled election years where government parties receive substantial more private contributions than 
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non-government parties. The results hold significant implications for the wider scholarly and policy 
discussion about the effect and desirability of incumbent governments' ability to call early elections.  
 
A theory of incumbency advantage in private contributions for early elections 
The theoretical argument of this article is that there exists an incumbent party advantage in private 
contributions in years of early elections which is greater than in years of scheduled elections. This 
argument rests on the assumption that there exists information asymmetry between government parties 
and non-government parties with regards to knowledge about the timing of elections in a system which 
allows the government to call early elections. This asymmetry again spills over in an asymmetry 
between government and non-government parties with regards to planning fundraising activities as well 
as the information parties are able to convey to their potential private donors in years of non-scheduled 
elections.  
 
The behavior of private donors  
Let us first take the perspective of private donors to political parties. Private donors want to maximize 
the impact of their financial contributions, both if their motivation for giving financial contributions is 
to influence policymakers or to help favorite politicians get elected.4 Private contributions are assumed 
to be most valuable for political parties in election years, when they need discretionary funds for 
political advertising and general campaign expenses. This should cause private contributors to political 
                                                          
4 As in most theoretical models of political contributions (Grossman and Helpman 2001, 225-226). 
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parties to donate more money to political parties in election years, an expectation which generally fits 
the observed pattern of private contributions to political parties (Tomashevskiy 2015, 784).5 As we 
assume that private donors are budget constrained, they will need to budget money for political 
contributions. Given the electoral calendar they will, as a baseline, budget the majority of funds for 
political contributions for the scheduled election year. But in a political system which allows for 
elections held before the electoral term formally expires,6 the election will not necessarily be held in 
the year it is scheduled. Everything else being equal, we should then expect political parties to receive 
fewer private contributions in non-scheduled elections years, since private donors will not have 
budgeted the same amount of political contributions for non-scheduled election year. Especially, if we 
assume that private donors are not perfectly liquid during an electoral campaign.  
 
The role of information asymmetry  
However, incumbent political parties might know well before non-government parties when the 
election will be held, if calling early elections is the prerogative of the incumbent government.7 This 
argument rests on the assumption that early elections are often planned strategically by the government 
parties, who are able to call them, at least some times before they are officially called, which is 
supported by both previous research as well as anecdotal evidence (Schleiter and Tavits 2016, 836-
                                                          
5 This is also the case in Denmark, where political parties, in the years 1991-2013, received on average over twice the 
amount of private contributions in election years compared to non-election years.  
6 In the article mainly referred to as “non-scheduled” or “early” elections. 
7 In most OECD countries early elections can be called, although the government’s power to call them at its own discretion 
varies (Goplerud and Schleiter 2016). 
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837).8 Anecdotes about governments strategically calling elections include the Danish election of 2007, 
which was called about two years before the end of the electoral term at the height of pre-financial 
crisis economic upturn. This is not to say that non-government parties might not sometimes anticipate 
an early election but only that everything else being equal, government parties have better knowledge 
of the timing of early elections, when the incumbent government is able to call them  
 
This greater knowledge of the occurrence and timing of early elections enables government parties to 
signal to their potential donors9 well before an early election is officially called that they presently have 
a high demand for financial contributions. The parties might even convey that a non-scheduled election 
is upcoming to their donors. This information should allow the private donors to government parties 
more time to raise and rebudget money for political contributions in years of non-scheduled election 
than they would otherwise have had. The donors should be incentivized to antedate their contributions 
if they know an early election is coming since, as mentioned above, it is reasonable to assume that the 
donors are interested in donating when the political parties’ demand for private funding is highest, 
which is in election years, both scheduled and non-scheduled.  
 
Thus, assuming not perfect short-term liquidity of private donors to non-government parties, donors to 
government parties should everything else being equal give more private contributions in non-
scheduled election years than donors to non-government parties, since government donors have had 
                                                          
8 Of course, early elections are sometimes called due to a unanticipated government crisis or political scandal in which case 
the incumbency advantage should not necessarily exist.   
9 For an example, they can contact previous donors to the party.  
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relatively more time to raise and rebudget funds for political contributions. Consequently, we should 
expect government parties to receive more private contributions than non-government parties in years 
of non-scheduled election, when the election is called early by the incumbent government.  
 
Apart from the donor signaling mechanism, another way the information asymmetry about election 
timing might benefit government parties is through a more purely intraparty and organizational 
channel. Knowledge about upcoming non-scheduled elections should enable government parties to 
activate their party fundraisers well before non-government parties can do it. This mobilization 
includes volunteers which are mainly mobilized during elections. So, the incumbency advantage should 
be especially pronounced for these type of party fundraisers. This advantage in internal resource 
mobilization should be an additional reason for why government parties should be more successful in 
getting private contributions in non-scheduled election years than non-government parties.  
 
Of course, the degree of this advantage in mobilization depends on how much time in advance of the 
official election announcement the government had decided to actually call early elections and thus the 
time advantage these parties have had in mobilizing fundraisers. But even if the government 
party/parties decided to call elections only a few weeks before the early election is officially called, 
especially if the electoral campaign is only a couple of weeks long, the government party fundraisers 
might have 50-100 percent more time to do fundraising activities than non-government party 
fundraisers which is a large relative advantage. Thus, even when the government has not planned the 
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early election much in advantage, this slight advantage in election timing knowledge might translate 
into a large relative advantage for government parties with regards to fundraising activities.  
 
Assumptions and conditional factors  
The above reasoning rests on the assumption that the government parties’ signal to their potential 
contributors of higher demand for financial contributions and the possibility of an upcoming early 
election is private information. It is also assumed that the total contributions received by political 
parties are not immediately observed by the rival parties. These are arguable realistic assumptions 
given that political parties’ accounts, to the extent they are even public knowledge, are usually not 
made public within the current year. In Denmark for an example, it can take up to two years before the 
political parties’ accounts are made publically available. Even when the publication of political parties’ 
accounts happen much sooner, it will usually not be before the electoral campaign, in which the 
contributions were spent, is over.  
 
However, if the donors to government and non-government parties are 100 percent identical, we might 
no longer expect the same degree of information asymmetry between government and non-government 
parties. In this case, donors receiving a signal from an incumbent party about increased demand for 
private contributions, and thus might expect that an early election is coming, might simultaneously 
choose to rebudget their funds to non-government parties. In most political systems this is hardly 
realistic, especially considering political systems where the main motivation for giving political 
contributions is to help favorite politicians/parties getting elected. Even in the presence of some multi-
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party and multi-bloc donors, we should expect incumbent government parties to mainly signal 
increased demand for contributions and the possibility of upcoming early elections to donors they are 
fairly certain will only donate to them. For an example, left-of-center government parties who know an 
early election is coming might signal this ahead of time to their trade union donors, while a center-right 
government party who is planning to call an early election might signal an increased demand for 
contributions to previous donors from business associations, while both types of parties will not signal 
to centrist interest organizations or firms that usually donate both to the center-right and the center-left 
parties.10  
 
However, according the arguments above, in the presence of many multi-party and/or multi-bloc 
donors, the incumbency advantage in private contributions for early elections shrinks, as incumbent 
parties are less likely to signal to these donors that an early election might be forthcoming since this 
information might benefit their opponents as well as themselves financially. Thus, the information 
asymmetry, and consequently the incumbency advantage in private contribution for early elections, 
should increase with the exclusiveness of donors to certain parties and decrease the more donors to 
government parties also donate to rival parties.  
 
With regards to the mobilization of party fundraisers, this mechanism is also variable to other political 
characteristics. If the electoral campaign is fairly long, perhaps due to constitutionally or other 
                                                          
10 As an example, in Denmark in 2009, a political funding organization associated with the Danish Bankers’ Association 
donated money both to the Danish major center-right parties as well as the Danish Social Democrats.  
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procedural requirements, the advantage of having mobilized party fundraisers before the election is 
officially called shrinks, as non-government parties then have plenty of time during the electoral 
campaign to mobilize their fundraisers and for their donors to rebudget and raise funds. Thus, the 
incumbency advantage in for early elections decrease with the length of the electoral campaign. 
 
Hypothesis  
Based on the arguments, we should expect a relative advantage in private contributions for incumbent 
government parties in years of early elections, especially in political systems characterized by high 
level of exclusiveness of donors to certain political parties, high government election calling power and 
fairly short electoral campaigns. This leads to the central hypothesis of this article:  
H1: Government parties would receive more private contributions than non-government parties in early 
election years compared to years of scheduled elections.  
 
Case: Danish parties’ private contributions 
The empirical test of an incumbent advantage in private contributions in years of early elections is 
based on an analysis of Danish political parties' private funding in the years 1991-2013. Denmark 
constitutes an interesting case for a test for an incumbency advantage in private contributions for early 
elections, due to the nature of private funding to political parties in Denmark and the fact that Danish 
prime ministers have a relative high ability to call early elections and that Denmark has fairly short 
electoral campaigns if an election is unanticipated. However, key features of the Danish political 
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system, such as a party system with multiple parties situated largely along a left-right scale, a 
parliamentary system of government, public funding for political parties, frequent coalitions 
governments, as well as the ability of the incumbent government to call elections, are common in most 
European democracies. Consequently, the analysis of the Danish case should also be able to shed light 
on dynamics of early elections and private contributions to political parties which might also be at work 
in other parliamentary democracies.11 The rest of this section describes the features of the Danish 
system which are relevant for the theoretical argument about the relationship between early elections 
and the incumbency advantage in private contributions.  
 
While the majority of party funding in Denmark is public and based on parties' previous vote share in 
parliamentary elections, private contributions by trade unions, employers' associations, and 
contributions from private foundations, firms and individuals constitute a non-trivial share of Danish 
parties’ income, especially in years of elections. According to Danish law, there is no upper limit for 
how many private contributions a political party can receive, no upper limit for campaign spending, 
and parties only need to publically list the name of a political donor if this donor’s contribution exceeds 
20,000 Danish kroner. Although listing the total amount of private contributions is mandatory. While 
some associations and firms donate to a variety of political parties, many Danish parties have 
historically had ideological and organizational ties with labor market associations which also affect 
present and previous contribution patterns. Danish trade unions thus typically donate to Danish 
leftwing parties, especially the Social Democrats, while the employers' associations typically donate to 
                                                          
11 However, certain features of private funding in Denmark are different from some other European and Western 
democracies such as the strong ideological bias of most large political donors.  
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the major center-right parties. Danish political parties are thus to some extent able to know the identity 
of many of their main private donors, which are often exclusive to parties or bloc of parties.  
 
Regarding early elections in Denmark, the Danish prime minister12 can call for legislative elections at 
any time during the four-year electoral calendar, which makes Denmark among the countries with the 
highest government electoral calling power among advanced economies (Goplerud and Schleiter 2016, 
435- 436). The Danish electoral law does not specially a specific minimum number of days from the 
announcement of the elections to the holding of the election but, in order to live up to other formal 
requirements of Danish elections, the norm is that the elections should announced at least 20-21 days 
before they is held, which makes the electoral campaign fairly short. So, the combination of very 
flexible electoral calendar along with the ability of parties to know their private donors, and the fact 
that major private donors tend to give exclusively to one bloc of parties, should fit the theoretical 
assumptions for a potential incumbent government advantage in private contributions for non-
scheduled elections. The next section describes the data used to test this prediction.  
 
  
                                                          
12 According to the wording of the Danish constitution the power is officially with the monarch but de-facto and according 
to constitutional norms the power is with the prime minister.  
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Data and empirical strategy 
The data for Danish parties' private contributions comes from the accounts of Danish political parties,13 
which have been publically available for all Danish parties since 1991.14 The private contributions 
analyzed in this study concern those donated to the national central party organization and not 
individual candidates and local party organizations, where data is generally not publically available 
throughout the period. The accounts of the Danish political parties are usually audited and since, unlike 
some political systems, there is no upper limits to how many private contributions can be received, 
parties face little incentive to hide at least the total amount of private contributions received.15 Private 
contributions are defined as contributions from both firms, private associations including labor market 
organizations and individuals, which include Danish parliamentarians themselves. 16  The private 
contributions per party-year is measured in 1000 Danish kroner (DKK) and converted into constant 
2000 prices using a price index from the government statistical agency, Statistics Denmark.  
 
                                                          
13 New Danish parties enter the sample as data for them becomes available. Parties not represented in the parliament are not 
part of the sample. The centrist party Center Democrats, which was represented in the Danish parliament until 2001, is not 
part of the sample.  
14 Data from 2012 and onwards are available on the Danish Parliament's website. I am grateful to Karina Korsiara-Pedersen 
for providing the data from the 1991-2012 period.  
15 Although, the specific contribution from each private donor is usually not disclosed.  
16 Some Danish leftwing parties issue a "party tax" on their parliamentarians, but the level and scope of this technically 
private contribution are within the control of the party itself, so it is counted as a private contribution for the sake of this 
article.  
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The central independent variables of interest are government party status and the occurrence of a 
legislative election as well as the status of the election. A party is defined as a government party if it is 
part of a government in January of the given year.17 A concern might be that the government status of a 
party might change from January to the month in which the election is held. However, during all 
election years in the dataset, parties which were in government in January of an election year were also 
in government at the time of the election. All Danish governments in the analyzed period were 
coalition governments, so I do not include any controls for whether the government was a single-party 
or a coalition government.  
 
Regarding elections, In order to test the article’s hypothesis, I distinguish between scheduled elections 
and non-scheduled elections. A scheduled election is defined as an election held within 12 months of 
the end of the official electoral term. A non-scheduled or early election is an election held in any other 
period, where private donors presumably will have budgeted relatively less funds for political 
contributions than in a scheduled election year.  In appendix A, I report the results from an alternative 
coding of scheduled elections, where a scheduled election is defined as an election held in the last 
calendar year of the electoral term. These results, however, are similar to that of the main analysis.18  
                                                          
17 Formal support parties for the current government, such as the Danish Peoples Parties during the tenure of the 2001-2011 
center-right coalition, are not coded as government parties, since the theoretical argument rests on the assumption that the 
information asymmetry arise from being formally part of the government and thus able to directly influence strategic 
election calling without necessarily invoking a vote of no-confidence.  
18 The core results are also robust to coding a scheduled elections as an election held within 6 months of the end of the 
official electoral term. Results are available upon request. 
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To control for the size of the party, which could also be a predictor of both government status and the 
level of private funding, I control for the number of parliamentary seats the party holds in the Danish 
legislature based on the last election results. In a later robustness test, GDP growth and unemployment 
rate from Statistics Denmark are added to control for the general state of the economy, which might 
also affect the level of private contributions, as well as the incentive to call early elections (Kayser 
2005; Riera 2015). As a final control, and as a last robustness test, I also include a dummy for whether 
a municipal election is held, since the occurrence of municipal elections might also affect the timing of 
early elections. Descriptive statistics can be found in table 1.   
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
Variable  Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max Obs.  
Private contribution in constant 1000 DKK  3822.09 6306.02 24.140 33201.17 184 
Scheduled election 0.22 0.41 0 1 184 
Non-scheduled election 0.04 0.20 0 1 184 
Government party 0.27 0.44 0 1 184 
Number of seats  20.97 18.98 0 69 184 
GDP growth  1.41 2.09 -5.10 5.30 184 
Unemployment rate 5.94 2.76 1.90 11.90 184 
Municipal election 0.27 0.44 0 1 184 
 
The estimation method is OLS with party-fixed and year-fixed effects to capture a general trend in 
private contributions to political parties over the analyzed time period.19 Party-fixed effects enable me 
to hold the general ideological orientation and historical legacy of the party constant which could 
include special relationships with wealthy donor organizations. Furthermore, the party-fixed effects 
analysis captures deviations in private contributions from the party average. However, since both 
                                                          
19 Results are similar if a time-trend is used instead of year-fixed effects. These results are available upon request.  
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government status and the number of seats each party controls in the parliament vary within parties 
over the analyzed time periods, these important variables can still be included in the estimation.20  
 
 In order to control for previous levels of private contributions, I also include a lagged dependent 
variable.21 The regression equation can be seen in equation one, where Gov. is a dummy measuring 
whether the party p is in government at time t. E is whether there is an election year and the third term 
is the interaction between government party status and an election. During the analysis, I distinguish 
between scheduled elections and non-scheduled elections. S is the number of seats the party holds, 
which serve as a proxy for party size. C is a vector of control variables consisting of GDP growth, 
unemployment rate and the occurrence of a municipal election, which are added in later specifications 
as controls for the general state of the economy and the occurrence of a concurrent election at time t. 𝜇𝑡 
are year-fixed effects, 𝛾𝑝 the party-fixed effect and ε is the error term.  
𝐶𝑜𝑛.𝑝𝑡= 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑛.𝑝𝑡−1+ 𝛽2𝐺𝑜𝑣.𝑝𝑡+ 𝛽3𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑜𝑣.𝑝𝑡 𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡+𝛾𝑝 + 𝜀𝑝𝑡               (1) 
Standard errors are clustered at both the party- and year-level in order to account for autocorrelation22 
and the fact that election occurrence and the state of the economy are common for all parties within 
each year.   
                                                          
20 However, the core results do not change with the removal of party-fixed and year-fixed effects. These results are available 
upon request.  
21 However, the results are not substantively different with the exclusion of the lagged dependent variable. Results are 
available upon request.  
22 Which a Wooldridge test suggest is an issue.  
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Results 
To test hypothesis 1, and thus the theoretical argument of the paper, in table 2, I test whether a potential 
incumbency advantage in election year private contributions is larger for early elections compared to 
scheduled elections. In columns one and two, I first look at the effect of scheduled elections and 
government status on the level of private contribution. In column one, both government status and the 
occurrence of a scheduled election increases the level of private contributions. However, only 
government status is statistically significant at conventional levels. The number of mandates also seems 
to have a positive and statistical significant effect on the level of private contribution, indicating that as 
parties increase their seat share, so do they increase their level of private contribution. In column two, 
the government dummy is interacted with the scheduled election dummy and this interaction is 
positive, indicating that an election increases the government advantage with regards to private 
contribution found in column one. However, this interaction is not statistically significant.  
 
Turning to non-scheduled or early elections in column three, neither the non-scheduled election dummy 
or the government party dummy are statistically significant although they are both positive. However, 
when these two variables are interacted in column four, the interaction has a positive and strongly 
statistically significant effect on the level of private contributions. The combination of an early election 
year (as compared to other years, including scheduled election years) and government status boosts the 
party’s level of private contribution with over 10 million DKK, over twice the amount received in 
private contribution on average by a Danish party during the analyzed period. This provides substantial 
evidence in favor of hypothesis 1 and the theoretical argument that the ability of an incumbent 
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government to know the occurrence of an early election well before other parties gives them a 
substantial relative advantage with regards to raise private contributions.  
 
However, in column 4, the reference category to non-scheduled election year are all other years, both 
non-election years and scheduled elections, so in order to compare non-scheduled election years to 
scheduled elections years, in column five, scheduled and non-scheduled elections are analyzed in the 
same statistical estimation with non-election year as the reference category. Here, the interaction 
between a non-scheduled election and the government party dummy is still statistically significant and 
actually increases in effect size, while the interaction between government party dummy and the 
scheduled election dummy is not statistically significant, although the effect is still positive but only 
half the size of the non-scheduled election/government party dummy interaction. A post-estimation 
Wald’s F-test also suggest that the difference between the two interactions’ coefficients is statistically 
significant (P= 0.03). Thus, there is substantially evidence in favor of hypothesis 1, government parties 
receive more private contributions than non-government parties in early election years compared to 
years of scheduled elections. Consequently, there is evidence of a substantial incumbency advantage 
with regards to private funding for early election years.  
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Table 2. Electoral cycle in private contributions by election type 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged dependent variable  
0.28 
(0.19) 
0.28 
(0.19) 
0.28 
(0.19) 
0.31 
(0.17)* 
0.32 
(0.17)* 
Scheduled election 
1892.38 
(1338.27) 
1449.83 
(1442.69) 
- - 
1237.65 
(1535.77) 
Non-scheduled election - - 
1460.64 
(1152.31) 
-1164.22 
(932.90) 
-1526.52 
(913.19)* 
Government party 
2669.58 
(1415.88)* 
747.48 
(1173.49) 
1892.38 
(1343.44) 
1427.16 
(1251.20) 
95.52 
(1059.46) 
Number of seats  
  235.04 
(125.82)* 
220.65 
(116.17)* 
235.04 
(125.66)* 
224.37 
(129.80)* 
207.08 
(122.09)* 
Scheduled election X government party  - 
5098.89 
(3683.72) 
- - 
5693.56 
(3833.22) 
Non-scheduled election X government party - - - 
10643.76 
(1849.38)*** 
11861.01 
(2435.99)*** 
Party-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 175 175 175 175 175 
Number of parties 9 9 9 9 9 
Within R-squared 0.46 0.65 0.46 0.65 0.69 
Dependent variable is private contributions in constant 1000 DKK. Double-clustered standard errors in parentheses.  
*: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01.  
 
The marginal effects of the interaction between early (non-scheduled) elections and government party 
status is visualized in figure 1, which is based on table 2 column four. It clearly shows the incumbency 
advantage for early elections. An early election increases political parties’ level of private contributions 
but only for government parties, while government parties receive substantially more private funding 
than non-government parties but only in an early election year.  
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Figure 1: The interactive effect between early election and government status  
a: Early election effect conditional on being government party b. Effect of government party conditional on early election 
  
Note: Vertical lines show 90 pct. confidence intervals.  
 
 
Robustness test: The role of the national economy and concurrent elections 
The above results provide evidence in favor of the theoretical argument that incumbent government 
parties have a relative advantage with regards to private contributions in non-scheduled elections years. 
However, the previous analysis does not consider factors which could be endogenous to the occurrence 
of early elections, such as the state of the national economy at the time of the early elections and the 
occurrence of concurrent elections.  
 
The state of national economic aggregates such as GDP growth and unemployment might affect the 
perceived popularity of the incumbent government and thus the incentive of the government to actually 
call early elections (Kayser 2005; Riera 2015). Increased popularity might also spill over in 
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government parties receiving relatively more private contributions. Thus, the relationship between 
early elections and private contributions might be endogenous to the state of the national economy, as 
incumbent governments might also be more tempted to call early elections if the economy is booming 
which at the same time also increases their relative level of private contributions.23  
 
To address these issues, I redo the analysis from table 2 column five and add controls for potential 
economic confounders of early elections, namely the national unemployment rate and GDP growth. 
The results are reported in table 3. However, the inclusion of these potential economic confounders 
does not change the statistical significance or the size effect of the interaction between government 
party status and non-scheduled election occurrence. Surprisingly, GDP growth seems to have a 
statistically significant negative effect on private contributions, while the unemployment rate has no 
statistically significant effect.  
 
  
                                                          
23 It might also be plausible that private contributions to political parties, including government parties, would be greater in 
economic boom years, if private contributions to political parties can be seen as a consumption good. The question of 
political contribution as political investment or consumption is a considerable topic in the study of political contributions, 
especially in the US (Gordon et al. 2007).  
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Table 3. Robustness test: Economic confounders  
 
(1) 
Lagged dependent variable 
0.32 
(0.21) 
Scheduled election 
49598.18 
(1509.57)*** 
Government party 
95.52 
(1098.85) 
Scheduled election X government party  
5693.56 
(4262.63) 
Non-scheduled election  
49626.01 
(973.25)*** 
Non-scheduled election X government party  
11861.01 
(2510.33)*** 
Number of seats  
207.08 
(150.96) 
GDP growth 
-30449.48 
(146.50)*** 
Unemployment  
10694.14 
(252.49) 
Party-fixed effects Yes 
Year-fixed effects  Yes 
Number of observations 175 
Number of parties 9 
Within R-squared  0.55 
Dependent variable is private contributions in constant 1000 DKK.  
Double-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01.  
 
As a final robustness test, I include a control for the occurrence of a municipal elections. Since Danish 
municipal elections cannot be held early, incumbent governments could time national elections to 
municipal elections, as was the case of the Danish national election of 2001, in order to attempt to pool 
mobilization and campaign resources both from a national and local level. Furthermore, since 
concurrent elections might mobilize citizens at least with regards to voting (Geys 2006, 652), the 
occurrence of a municipal election in the same year as a national election might also affect the level of 
political contributions to national political parties positively through an increased mobilization of party 
fundraisers and party supporters. Alternatively, the occurrence of a concurrent election at the local level 
might affect private contributions to the national political parties negatively due to a crowding out 
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effect. Party supporters might simply choose to contribute some of their budgeted financial 
contributions to party candidates at the local level rather than the party at the national level. The 
relationship between municipal election occurrence and early national elections is thus potentially 
endogenous within the area of private political contributions. The estimation with the inclusion of the 
municipal election variable is reported in table 4. However, the inclusion of the municipal election 
variable does not change neither the size effect nor the statistical significance of the non-scheduled 
election and government party interaction. The municipal election variable itself has a positive size and 
statistically significant effect on the level of political contributions, while its inclusion actually makes 
the GDP growth variable turn positive with a strong substantial and statistically significant effect.  
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Table 4. Robustness test: Municipal election occurrence 
 
(1) 
Lagged dependent variable 
0.32 
( 0.18)* 
Scheduled election  
2739.79 
(1651.37)* 
Government party 
  95.52 
(1110.02) 
Scheduled election X government party  
5693.56 
(3947.91) 
Non-scheduled election  
823.71 
(743.48) 
Non-scheduled election X government party  
11861.01 
(2506.83)*** 
Number of seats  
207.08 
(128.50) 
GDP growth 
2290.00 
(824.71)*** 
Unemployment  
-48.508 
(174.66) 
Municipal election  
2199.69 
(830.26)*** 
Party-fixed effects Yes 
Year-fixed effects   Yes 
Number of observations 175 
Number of parties 9 
Within R-squared  0.55 
Dependent variable is private contributions in constant 1000 DKK.  
Double-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01.  
 
The empirical evidence in favor of an incumbent party advantage in private contributions in years of 
early elections thus seems to be robust both when controlling for macro-economic conditions and the 
occurrence of a concurrent election.   
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Conclusion  
The article has argued that incumbent government parties, in a political system which allows the 
government to call early elections, can use this asymmetry of knowledge about election timing to gain 
a relative advance in private contributions compared to non-government parties in years of non-
scheduled elections. An analysis of Danish political parties' private funding in the years 1991-2013 
provides strong evidence in favor of this argument. There exists a significant government party 
advantage in private contributions in early election years. The evidence suggests that being able to 
choose times of real or perceived government popularity and favorable economic cycles are not the 
only advantages incumbent government parties gain from the ability to call early elections. Whether 
this funding advantage might contribute to the apparent incumbent vote gains from early elections 
(Schleiter and Tavits, 2016) is a more open question.  
 
The findings of this article relates to the wider scholarly and normative discussions of the advantages of 
fixed versus non-fixed election dates, an area which has recently been reformed in both parts of Canada 
and the UK24 (Leuprecht and McHugh 2008; Schleiter and Belu 2016), and which continues to be the 
subject of public debate in other democratic countries. The question of government accountability, 
which normally is cornerstone of the debate on electoral surfing by incumbent governments (Riera 
2015, 1146-1147; Schleiter and Tavits 2016, 848), apparently has to be supplemented with the question 
                                                          
24 The early UK election in June 2017 suggests that the British reform might not have de-facto disincentivized the use of 
early elections.  
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of resource equality among government and opposition parties and among parties in general. See Potter 
and Tavits (2015) for a recent piece on this topic.  
 
Future research could explore the generality of the non-scheduled election incumbency advantage in 
private funding in other countries as well as across countries. While we might expect the findings from 
the Danish case to generalize to other multi-party democracies where the government has the ability to 
call early elections, which is the majority of European democracies, the magnitude of the incumbent 
financial advantage in years of early elections might vary with minor institutional differences across 
countries.  
 
The relative advantage for government parties in non-scheduled elections found in the Danish case 
could potentially be much stronger in countries where private funding of political parties plays a larger 
role. However, the Danish case also have some of the prerequisites for the existence of a particular 
strong incumbency advantage with regards to private contributions such as high government election 
calling power, high level of exclusiveness of donors to political parties and a fairly short electoral 
campaigns. As stated in this article’s theory section, political and institutional characteristics of a 
country might also condition the size of the incumbency advantage for early elections. If the 
mechanisms for the government party advantage in non-scheduled elections are better time to prepare 
party campaign fundraising and more time for government parties’ donors to raise funding, we should 
expect the incumbency advantage to decrease with the length of the electoral campaign and increase as 
private donors become more exclusive to single parties or bloc of parties and vice versa.  
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In some European democracies with high election calling power and high level of exclusiveness of 
political donors, such as UK prior to its adoption of fixed electoral terms (Schleiter and Belu 2016), we 
might thus expect larger or equally large incumbency advantage as in Denmark, whereas in other 
countries such as Germany, where incumbency electoral calling power is weaker (Goplerud and 
Schleiter 2016) and ideological political actors such as trade unions and other labor market 
organizations are not allowed to contribute to political parties,  we might expect little or no incumbency 
advantage for early elections. The theoretical argument and findings of this article thus suggest that 
political reforms, both targeting the ability of incumbent government to call early elections, the legally 
required length of electoral campaigns as well as regulation of which organizations and entities are 
allowed to donate financially to political parties, 25  might matter substantively for the potential 
incumbency advantage in private contributions for early elections.   
 
Additionally, whether the apparent incumbency advantage in private contributions in non-scheduled 
election years is different between single-party and coalition governments as well as between majority 
and minority governments could be interesting to investigate in a political system where there is more 
frequent changes between these government types than in Denmark.26  
 
                                                          
25 As well as perhaps whether the total amount of private contributions are capped or not.  
26 Especially, as these factors also seem related to the prevalence of early elections (Riera 2015). 
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Since it is reasonable to assume that different type of political donors face different liquidity constraint 
and vary in their ability to donate in years of non-expected elections, we should also expect the effect 
of early elections to be heterogonous between types of private donors.27  
 
Finally, it could be entirely possible that the occurrence of early elections are potentially partly 
endogenous to private contributions. Government parties receiving large private contributions in the 
middle of the electoral cycle might choose to call early elections to capitalize of this relative advantage 
in campaign funds,28 which would be a related but alternative way in which the ability to call early 
elections would translate into an incumbency advantage which regards to private contributions. Testing 
whether private contributions affect early elections, however, would require much more detailed party 
funding data, such as private contributions received by political parties at the monthly or daily basis, 
than is presently available. All these issues could be fruitful venues for further research on party 
finance and its link to election timing in a comparative perspective.  
 
  
                                                          
27 The mechanism for an incumbency advantage in private contributions might also change if the motivation of the donor is 
to buy access to policymakers. If early elections signal a higher chance of winning for the incumbent, see Schleiter and 
Tavits (2016), this might make access-oriented donors more likely to donate to the incumbent. I owe this alternative 
mechanisms to a previous commenter.  
28 I am thankful to one of the reviewers for pointing this alternative relationship out.  
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Appendix A: Analysis with scheduled election coded by calendar year  
 
Table A1. Electoral cycle in private contribution by election type 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged dependent variable  
0.28 
(0.19) 
0.28 
(0.18) 
0.28 
(0.19) 
0.31 
(0.21) 
0.31 
(0.18)* 
Scheduled election 
2669.58 
(1425.21)* 
1621.36 
(1246.78) 
- - 
1292.67 
(1408.56) 
Non-scheduled election - - 
1460.64 
(1139.52) 
-558.17 
(788.72) 
-892.32 
(977.29) 
Government party 
1892.38 
(1342.73) 
1085.08 
(1103.86) 
1892.38 
(1336.91) 
1191.60 
( 1208.04) 
95.73 
(1050.69) 
Number of seats  
235.04 
(125.75)* 
226.09 
(123.28)* 
235.04 
(125.66)* 
  220.37 
(122.34)* 
207.237 
(119.78)* 
Scheduled election X government party  - 
4439.34 
(3005.66) 
- - 
5478.54 
(3672.69) 
Non-scheduled election X government party - - - 
8111.15 
(2233.38)*** 
9263.85 
(3413.45)*** 
Party-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 175 175 175 175 175 
Number of parties 9 9 9 9 9 
Within R-squared 0.63 0.49 0.46  0.51 0.55 
Dependent variable is private contributions in constant 1000 DKK. Double-clustered standard errors in parentheses.  
*: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01.  
 
Figure A1: The interactive effect between early election and government status  
a: Early election effect conditional on being government party b. Effect of government party conditional on early election 
  
Note: The marginal effects are based on the estimation in table A1, column four.  Vertical lines show 90 pct. confidence intervals.  
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Table A2. Robustness test: Economic confounders  
 
(1) 
Lagged dependent variable  
0.31 
(0.26) 
Scheduled election  
  48672.64 
(1525.92)*** 
Government party 
95.73 
(1082.77) 
Scheduled election X government party  
5478.54 
(3932.59) 
Non-scheduled election  
49232.95 
(1030.11)*** 
Non-scheduled election X government party  
9263.85 
(4355.28)** 
Number of seats  
  207.24 
(153.88) 
GDP growth 
-29789.95 
(157.82)*** 
Unemployment  
  10472.34 
(261.66)*** 
Party-fixed effects Yes 
Year-fixed effects  Yes 
Number of observations 175 
Number of parties 9 
Within R-squared  0.55 
Dependent variable is private contributions in constant 1000 DKK.  
Double-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01.  
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Table A3. Robustness test: Municipal election occurrence 
 
(1) 
Lagged dependent variable  
0.31 
(0.20) 
Scheduled election  
2791.31 
(1475.47)* 
Government party 
95.73 
(1091.77) 
Scheduled election X government party  
5478.54 
(3858.18) 
Non-scheduled election  
1448.24 
(785.48)* 
Non-scheduled election X government party  
9263.85 
(3441.75)*** 
Number of seats  
207.24 
(126.53) 
GDP growth 
  2266.87 
(849.18)*** 
Unemployment  
-46.30 
(161.12) 
Municipal election  
2153.82 
(884.42)** 
Party-fixed effects Yes 
Year-fixed effects   Yes 
Number of observations 175 
Number of parties 9 
Within R-squared  0.55 
Dependent variable is private contributions in constant 1000 DKK.  
Double-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01.  
 
 
